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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Ayobami Adegoke
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cd7c22325b |
ci: run the Python test suite — CONTRIBUTING.md asks for tests CI never executes (#100)
* ci: run the Python test suite - CONTRIBUTING.md asks for tests CI never executes
CONTRIBUTING.md tells contributors to put Python tool tests in tests/
and run the relevant suites, and tests/ now holds real ones
(test_salary_lookup.py, test_convert_salary_excel.py from #75) - but no
CI job executes them. A suite that never runs in CI can't gate a PR and
silently rots. New python-tests job: unittest discover over tests/,
stdlib only, no new dependencies. Future test files run without any
workflow change.
Also lands tests/test_security_guards.py, which missed #84's merge
window (pushed to the branch as #84 was being merged; the merge took
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Ilya Strelov
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b8d35a4b69 |
Add freehire-search: country-agnostic freehire.dev aggregator skill (#85)
* feat(freehire-search): add country-agnostic freehire.dev aggregator skill
Adds a portal-search skill over the freehire.dev public JSON API — an
open-source IT job aggregator normalizing ~50 ATS platforms across many
markets into one schema. Like linkedin-search it is country-agnostic and
zero-dependency (plain bun + fetch), but it queries a JSON API rather than
scraping HTML, so results carry structured facets (skills/seniority/region).
Honors the portal-skill contract: search + detail commands, --format
json|table|plain, stderr JSON errors with exit 1, backoff on 429/5xx. Reads
are public (no API key) — the same zero-signup bar as linkedin-search. The
hosted-service dependency (best-effort, no SLA) is labeled prominently in
SKILL.md, and FREEHIRE_API_URL swaps the base URL for a self-hosted backend.
Scoped tech-first: triggers cover software/data/engineering roles, where the
faceted filtering is strong; non-tech coverage exists but is still maturing.
Network-free tests (mocked fetch + pure reshape/parse functions); CI matrix
updated to typecheck the new CLI.
* refactor(freehire-search): clarity pass on cli flag parsing
No behavior change. Replace a nested ternary and a comma-operator side effect
in a ternary with explicit if/else, and fix a comment that described facets
while sitting on the alias map.
* refactor(freehire-search): tighten to boundary contracts, trim comments
- Validate/normalize at boundaries, trust the declared types inside: drop the
redundant '?? []' guards on facet arrays the wire contract already guarantees,
and the re-filter in buildQuery (commaList already stripped empties).
- Model enrichment as always-present (an unenriched job serializes it as {}),
removing the '?? {}' guard.
- Replace the positional table-row builder with a declarative column list; add a
shared shortDate and a labeled-field helper for detail's plain output.
- Extract stringFlag for the string-or-bare-boolean flags (--remote/--query/...).
- Dedup the response parse in apiGet to a single tolerant read (drop safeJson).
- SKILL.md: document partial data + the 'none' unspecified-region facet.
- Trim restating comments to the reference skills' density.
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Ayobami Adegoke
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e16afac7b9 |
ci: add supply-chain guards — permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifest checks, pinned actions (#84)
* ci: add supply-chain guards - permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifest checks, pinned actions This template's threat model is unusual: it ships pre-approved Claude Code permissions (.claude/settings.json) and CLI code that every fork user executes via those permissions. A plausible-looking PR could therefore ship risk to every forker: widen a permission to Bash(*), weaken the personal-data gitignore rules, or smuggle code execution into bun install via a lifecycle script. Nothing checked for these mechanically. New job security-guards runs tools/security_guards.py (stdlib only): - settings.json: every permissions.allow entry must be in an exact, in-repo allowlist. The guard makes permission changes loud, not impossible - a PR that intentionally widens permissions must update the allowlist in the same diff, so the widening is explicit and reviewable - .gitignore: the personal-data rules (tracker, documents/**, cv/main_*, salary data, seen_jobs) must all still be present - the mirror image of the placeholder-integrity job - .agents/**/package.json: no lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/ postinstall/prepare/prepack) and no trustedDependencies, which would execute arbitrary code during bun install on users' machines New job dependency-review (PRs only): actions/dependency-review-action flags newly introduced vulnerable or malicious dependencies, fail-on-severity high. Workflow hardening: explicit top-level permissions: contents: read (least-privilege token), and all actions pinned to commit SHAs resolved from the same major tags already in use (checkout v4, setup-python v5, setup-bun v2), with the tag recorded in a comment. Honest limit, recorded in the workflow header: a PR can edit this workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual attempts, not a determined author. Branch protection with required checks and human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop. Verified locally: positive run passes; injecting Bash(*) into settings.json, deleting the tracker gitignore rule, and adding a postinstall script each fail the guard with the intended message, and reverting restores a clean pass. * ci: scope dependency-review to upstream PRs - forks lack Dependency graph by default Verified on a fork: the action fails with 'Dependency review is not supported on this repository' until Dependency graph is manually enabled, and forks don't inherit it. Guarded with the same github.repository == upstream condition the other upstream-only jobs use. With the graph enabled the action passes, so the config itself is sound. * ci: probe Dependency graph before dependency-review - warn and pass when unavailable The upstream PR run showed Dependency graph is disabled on the upstream repo too (the action hard-fails: 'Dependency review is not supported on this repository'), not just on forks. Only the repo owner can enable it, so a hard red X here is friction, not signal. The job now probes the dependency-graph SBOM endpoint with the workflow token first: HTTP 200 runs the real review; anything else emits a ::warning:: naming the setting to flip (Settings -> Advanced Security -> Dependency graph) and passes. Same graceful-skip pattern the workflow uses for optional tools - the check self-activates the moment the graph is enabled, no workflow change needed. |
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Ayobami Adegoke
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6477987608 |
ci: add GitHub Actions workflow - LaTeX smoke compiles, skill lint, CLI typechecks, placeholder integrity (#59)
Every PR to this repo is currently verified by hand. This adds the checks
a machine can do:
- latex-smoke: compiles cv/main_example.tex (lualatex) and the new
cover_letters/cover_example.tex (xelatex) in the texlive/texlive
container, failing on any LaTeX error. Exact page-count assertions
(CV=2, cover letter=1) run on the upstream repo only
- lint (tools/lint_skills.py, also runnable locally): every SKILL.md has
parseable YAML frontmatter with name+description (frontmatter breakage
happened before -
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