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ai-job-search/.github/workflows/ci.yml
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Ayobami Adegoke e16afac7b9 ci: add supply-chain guards — permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifest checks, pinned actions (#84)
* ci: add supply-chain guards - permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifest checks, pinned actions

This template's threat model is unusual: it ships pre-approved Claude Code
permissions (.claude/settings.json) and CLI code that every fork user
executes via those permissions. A plausible-looking PR could therefore
ship risk to every forker: widen a permission to Bash(*), weaken the
personal-data gitignore rules, or smuggle code execution into bun install
via a lifecycle script. Nothing checked for these mechanically.

New job security-guards runs tools/security_guards.py (stdlib only):

- settings.json: every permissions.allow entry must be in an exact,
  in-repo allowlist. The guard makes permission changes loud, not
  impossible - a PR that intentionally widens permissions must update
  the allowlist in the same diff, so the widening is explicit and
  reviewable
- .gitignore: the personal-data rules (tracker, documents/**, cv/main_*,
  salary data, seen_jobs) must all still be present - the mirror image
  of the placeholder-integrity job
- .agents/**/package.json: no lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/
  postinstall/prepare/prepack) and no trustedDependencies, which would
  execute arbitrary code during bun install on users' machines

New job dependency-review (PRs only): actions/dependency-review-action
flags newly introduced vulnerable or malicious dependencies,
fail-on-severity high.

Workflow hardening: explicit top-level permissions: contents: read
(least-privilege token), and all actions pinned to commit SHAs resolved
from the same major tags already in use (checkout v4, setup-python v5,
setup-bun v2), with the tag recorded in a comment.

Honest limit, recorded in the workflow header: a PR can edit this
workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual attempts,
not a determined author. Branch protection with required checks and
human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop.

Verified locally: positive run passes; injecting Bash(*) into
settings.json, deleting the tracker gitignore rule, and adding a
postinstall script each fail the guard with the intended message, and
reverting restores a clean pass.

* ci: scope dependency-review to upstream PRs - forks lack Dependency graph by default

Verified on a fork: the action fails with 'Dependency review is not
supported on this repository' until Dependency graph is manually enabled,
and forks don't inherit it. Guarded with the same
github.repository == upstream condition the other upstream-only jobs use.
With the graph enabled the action passes, so the config itself is sound.

* ci: probe Dependency graph before dependency-review - warn and pass when unavailable

The upstream PR run showed Dependency graph is disabled on the upstream
repo too (the action hard-fails: 'Dependency review is not supported on
this repository'), not just on forks. Only the repo owner can enable it,
so a hard red X here is friction, not signal.

The job now probes the dependency-graph SBOM endpoint with the workflow
token first: HTTP 200 runs the real review; anything else emits a
::warning:: naming the setting to flip (Settings -> Advanced Security ->
Dependency graph) and passes. Same graceful-skip pattern the workflow
uses for optional tools - the check self-activates the moment the graph
is enabled, no workflow change needed.
2026-07-09 06:03:01 +02:00

163 lines
6.9 KiB
YAML

# CI for the framework itself: LaTeX smoke compiles, skill/command lint,
# CLI typechecks, and (upstream only) placeholder integrity.
#
# Fork-friendly by design: forks personalize CLAUDE.md, the skill files, and
# cv/main_example.tex via /setup, so the placeholder-integrity job and the
# exact page-count assertions run only on the upstream template repo. Compile
# success and lint correctness are asserted everywhere.
#
# Deliberately NOT here: live smoke tests of the job-portal CLIs. They hit
# real portals (network-flaky, and the linkedin-search skill is personal-use
# only per its own ToS warning - CI-automated requests would violate that).
# CLIs get typechecked instead; live testing stays a local, on-demand step.
#
# Security posture: this template ships pre-approved Claude Code permissions
# and CLI code that every fork user executes, so the security-guards job
# fails PRs that widen settings.json permissions, weaken the personal-data
# gitignore rules, or add package lifecycle scripts; dependency-review flags
# newly introduced vulnerable/malicious dependencies. Honest limit: a PR can
# edit this workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual
# attempts, not a determined author - branch protection with required checks
# and human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop.
# Actions are pinned to commit SHAs; the token is read-only.
name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [master]
pull_request:
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
lint:
name: Lint skills, commands, settings
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- run: pip install pyyaml
- run: python tools/lint_skills.py
security-guards:
name: Security guards (permissions, gitignore, manifests)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- run: python tools/security_guards.py
dependency-review:
name: Dependency review (upstream PRs only)
# Requires the repo's Dependency graph, which forks never inherit and
# which may be disabled upstream - so: upstream PRs only, and the
# graph is probed first. If it is unavailable, the job warns and
# passes instead of hard-failing (the same graceful-skip pattern the
# workflow uses for optional tools). Enabling Dependency graph under
# Settings -> Advanced Security activates the real check.
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.repository == 'MadsLorentzen/ai-job-search'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- name: Probe Dependency graph availability
id: graph
run: |
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${{ github.token }}" \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
"https://api.github.com/repos/${{ github.repository }}/dependency-graph/sbom")
if [ "$code" = "200" ]; then
echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "::warning::Dependency graph is not enabled on this repository (HTTP $code). Dependency review was skipped - enable Dependency graph under Settings -> Advanced Security to activate this check."
fi
- name: Dependency review
if: steps.graph.outputs.enabled == 'true'
uses: actions/dependency-review-action@2031cfc080254a8a887f58cffee85186f0e49e48 # v4.9.0
with:
fail-on-severity: high
latex-smoke:
name: Compile example CV and cover letter
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: texlive/texlive:latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- name: Compile CV example (lualatex)
run: |
cd cv
lualatex -interaction=nonstopmode main_example.tex
test -f main_example.pdf
if grep -q '^!' main_example.log; then
echo '::error::lualatex reported errors compiling cv/main_example.tex'
grep -A3 '^!' main_example.log
exit 1
fi
- name: Compile cover letter example (xelatex)
run: |
cd cover_letters
xelatex -interaction=nonstopmode cover_example.tex
test -f cover_example.pdf
if grep -q '^!' cover_example.log; then
echo '::error::xelatex reported errors compiling cover_letters/cover_example.tex'
grep -A3 '^!' cover_example.log
exit 1
fi
- name: Assert exact page counts (upstream template only)
if: github.repository == 'MadsLorentzen/ai-job-search'
run: |
grep -q 'Output written on main_example.pdf (2 pages' cv/main_example.log \
|| { echo '::error::cv/main_example.tex no longer compiles to exactly 2 pages'; exit 1; }
grep -q 'Output written on cover_example.pdf (1 page' cover_letters/cover_example.log \
|| { echo '::error::cover_letters/cover_example.tex no longer compiles to exactly 1 page'; exit 1; }
cli-typecheck:
name: Typecheck ${{ matrix.tool }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
tool:
- jobbank-search
- jobdanmark-search
- jobindex-search
- jobnet-search
- linkedin-search
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2
- run: bun install
working-directory: .agents/skills/${{ matrix.tool }}/cli
- run: bun run typecheck
working-directory: .agents/skills/${{ matrix.tool }}/cli
placeholder-integrity:
name: Placeholder integrity (upstream template only)
if: github.repository == 'MadsLorentzen/ai-job-search'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- name: Tracked template files must keep their placeholder tokens
run: |
fail=0
check() {
if ! grep -q "$2" "$1"; then
echo "::error file=$1::expected placeholder token $2 - personal data may have been committed"
fail=1
fi
}
check CLAUDE.md '\[YOUR_NAME\]'
check cv/main_example.tex '\[YOUR_NAME\]'
check cover_letters/cover_example.tex '\[YOUR NAME\]'
check .claude/skills/job-application-assistant/01-candidate-profile.md '<!-- SETUP'
check .claude/skills/job-application-assistant/04-job-evaluation.md '\[YOUR_PRIMARY_SKILLS\]'
exit $fail