cv/main_example.tex's sentinel was [YOUR_NAME] - a header comment and
the pdftitle, neither of which /setup's documented personalization
touches, so CI reported the file clean while it carried a real name,
address, phone and email (the review proved this end to end; the file
is the one CV the gitignore deliberately allows to be committed). The
guard now checks the \name{} and \email{} data lines, and 01's sentinel
moves from the <!-- SETUP comment onto [YOUR_EMAIL]. New test simulates
the /setup edit and requires every checked CV sentinel to be destroyed
by it. Review finding F28 (2026-08-19).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three findings from the 2026-08-19 review (F9, F31, F34):
- F9: every placeholder bullet written as \item [text] let LaTeX parse
the bracketed text as the item's optional label, rendering it clipped
off the left page edge and absent from the PDF text layer ("Achievement"
appeared 9 times in cv/main_example.tex and 0 times in the extraction,
with a clean compile and green CI). Bullets are now braced as
\item {[text]} in the example CV and in the template
06-cover-letter-templates.md teaches, and CI's stock PDF assertions
additionally require "Achievement" to survive pdftotext.
- F31: 05-cv-templates.md gains a "LaTeX Special Characters" section and
06's is completed beyond \_ and \&. The load-bearing case is an
unescaped % in a quantified achievement bullet: it starts a LaTeX
comment and silently deletes the rest of the line from the PDF.
- F34: the documented ATS extraction commands (apply.md,
05-cv-templates.md, CLAUDE.md) now carry -enc UTF-8. Xpdf-based
pdftotext builds default to Latin-1 output, so a correct non-ASCII CV
failed the replacement-character parseability check.
framework_version: 05-cv-templates.md 1.4.1 -> 1.4.2,
06-cover-letter-templates.md 1.0.1 -> 1.0.2. All three pinned by the new
tests/test_latex_guidance.py (9 tests; suite now 261).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Forks tracking this template face a weekly "which of these commits do I
actually care about?" question. check_upstream_updates.py answers it at the
file level (version stamps); this adds the commit-level half.
tools/upstream_triage.py walks the commits a fork is behind and splits them
into "worth reviewing" and "probably skip". Work already ported drops off on
its own via git patch-id, commits touching only files the fork removed are set
aside, and SHAs in .github/upstream-wontport.txt stay hidden. It reports and
nothing more - ready-to-run cherry-pick lines, but no merge, push, or PR,
since on a fork "applies cleanly" is not "correct".
.github/workflows/upstream-watch.yml runs it weekly into one rolling issue. It
no-ops on the upstream template (guarded, and pinned by a test) and uses only
the built-in GITHUB_TOKEN, so it can never write outside its own fork. The two
tools point at each other in their output; README, SETUP 8, and CHANGELOG
introduce them together. Tests cover patch-id matching, relevance filtering,
the won't-port list, and the workflow guard - all offline.
Co-authored-by: Angelina Lok <angelina@chattermill.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The cli-checks matrix hardcoded the six shipped portals, so a CLI
scaffolded by /add-portal in a fork shipped typecheck and test scripts
that fork CI never ran - while security_guards.py already globs
.agents/**/package.json and covers new portals automatically. A
discover-clis job now emits the matrix from
.agents/skills/*/cli/package.json; on upstream it resolves to the same
six portals, and a fork-added portal joins the matrix with no workflow
edit. /add-portal's Register step now says so.
The job was gated with `github.repository == 'MadsLorentzen/ai-job-search'`
on top of the pull_request check, so it never ran on any fork -
including every adaptation listed in the community fork-index
discussion. The job already probes Dependency graph availability and
gracefully warns-and-passes when the graph isn't enabled, so the
repository-name gate wasn't protecting against a real failure mode -
it was just silently skipping vulnerability scanning everywhere except
this one repo. Removing it lets any fork with Dependency graph enabled
get real coverage, and costs nothing on repos where it isn't (the
existing probe already handles that gracefully).
GitHub Sponsors profile for @MadsLorentzen is now live and accepting
sponsorships. Add it to FUNDING.yml so the repo's native "Sponsor this
project" box links to both GitHub Sponsors and Ko-fi, meeting developer
and non-developer supporters on whichever path is lowest-friction for
them. Ko-fi remains unchanged; the README Ko-fi block is untouched.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three personalized-fork PRs (#155, #162, #165) were filed against
upstream by accident in one week - GitHub points new fork PRs at the
upstream repo by default, and nothing warned about it at the moment of
filing. Adds a PR template with the heads-up in the compose box (plus
the review norms the process asks for anyway) and one sentence in
CONTRIBUTING's fork section naming the mechanism.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add framework_version markers to assistant skills and implement CI version guard and update checker
* Address review feedback: update ci.yml based on latest upstream, gate CI version guard to upstream repo, and remove non-ASCII characters from check_upstream_updates.py
* ci: run the Python test suite - CONTRIBUTING.md asks for tests CI never executes
CONTRIBUTING.md tells contributors to put Python tool tests in tests/
and run the relevant suites, and tests/ now holds real ones
(test_salary_lookup.py, test_convert_salary_excel.py from #75) - but no
CI job executes them. A suite that never runs in CI can't gate a PR and
silently rots. New python-tests job: unittest discover over tests/,
stdlib only, no new dependencies. Future test files run without any
workflow change.
Also lands tests/test_security_guards.py, which missed #84's merge
window (pushed to the branch as #84 was being merged; the merge took
2a6cb8c, the tests were 260c37a). 13 unittest cases in the existing
tests/ style: each copies the guard script into a synthetic repo tree
and runs it as a subprocess - the same way CI invokes it - asserting
real exit codes and messages. Every forbidden state fails (Bash(*) and
Bash(curl:*) additions, each personal-data gitignore rule removed one
at a time, each forbidden lifecycle script, trustedDependencies,
invalid settings JSON, zero manifests); every non-event passes (dropped
shipped permission, extra ignore rules, benign scripts, hostile
manifest inside node_modules); and the real repo passes its own guards.
22 tests total, all passing locally via the exact command the job runs.
* test: use benign lifecycle-script values in fixtures - AV heuristics flag attack-shaped strings
Review found the curl-pipe-to-sh fixture value matches a real Defender
signature (Trojan:Script/Stealer.HAX!MTB): Windows quarantines the temp
package.json mid-test, making the suite flaky for any Windows
contributor who runs it - while proving nothing extra, since the guard
flags the script KEY and never inspects the value.
Fixture values are now 'echo test' (also in the node_modules-ignored
test, same class of string), with a comment on the key-only test
explaining why the value must stay benign so a future 'make the fixture
realistic' cleanup doesn't reintroduce the quarantine flake. Coverage
is unchanged: same keys, same assertions, 13 tests passing.
* feat(freehire-search): add country-agnostic freehire.dev aggregator skill
Adds a portal-search skill over the freehire.dev public JSON API — an
open-source IT job aggregator normalizing ~50 ATS platforms across many
markets into one schema. Like linkedin-search it is country-agnostic and
zero-dependency (plain bun + fetch), but it queries a JSON API rather than
scraping HTML, so results carry structured facets (skills/seniority/region).
Honors the portal-skill contract: search + detail commands, --format
json|table|plain, stderr JSON errors with exit 1, backoff on 429/5xx. Reads
are public (no API key) — the same zero-signup bar as linkedin-search. The
hosted-service dependency (best-effort, no SLA) is labeled prominently in
SKILL.md, and FREEHIRE_API_URL swaps the base URL for a self-hosted backend.
Scoped tech-first: triggers cover software/data/engineering roles, where the
faceted filtering is strong; non-tech coverage exists but is still maturing.
Network-free tests (mocked fetch + pure reshape/parse functions); CI matrix
updated to typecheck the new CLI.
* refactor(freehire-search): clarity pass on cli flag parsing
No behavior change. Replace a nested ternary and a comma-operator side effect
in a ternary with explicit if/else, and fix a comment that described facets
while sitting on the alias map.
* refactor(freehire-search): tighten to boundary contracts, trim comments
- Validate/normalize at boundaries, trust the declared types inside: drop the
redundant '?? []' guards on facet arrays the wire contract already guarantees,
and the re-filter in buildQuery (commaList already stripped empties).
- Model enrichment as always-present (an unenriched job serializes it as {}),
removing the '?? {}' guard.
- Replace the positional table-row builder with a declarative column list; add a
shared shortDate and a labeled-field helper for detail's plain output.
- Extract stringFlag for the string-or-bare-boolean flags (--remote/--query/...).
- Dedup the response parse in apiGet to a single tolerant read (drop safeJson).
- SKILL.md: document partial data + the 'none' unspecified-region facet.
- Trim restating comments to the reference skills' density.
* ci: add supply-chain guards - permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifest checks, pinned actions
This template's threat model is unusual: it ships pre-approved Claude Code
permissions (.claude/settings.json) and CLI code that every fork user
executes via those permissions. A plausible-looking PR could therefore
ship risk to every forker: widen a permission to Bash(*), weaken the
personal-data gitignore rules, or smuggle code execution into bun install
via a lifecycle script. Nothing checked for these mechanically.
New job security-guards runs tools/security_guards.py (stdlib only):
- settings.json: every permissions.allow entry must be in an exact,
in-repo allowlist. The guard makes permission changes loud, not
impossible - a PR that intentionally widens permissions must update
the allowlist in the same diff, so the widening is explicit and
reviewable
- .gitignore: the personal-data rules (tracker, documents/**, cv/main_*,
salary data, seen_jobs) must all still be present - the mirror image
of the placeholder-integrity job
- .agents/**/package.json: no lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/
postinstall/prepare/prepack) and no trustedDependencies, which would
execute arbitrary code during bun install on users' machines
New job dependency-review (PRs only): actions/dependency-review-action
flags newly introduced vulnerable or malicious dependencies,
fail-on-severity high.
Workflow hardening: explicit top-level permissions: contents: read
(least-privilege token), and all actions pinned to commit SHAs resolved
from the same major tags already in use (checkout v4, setup-python v5,
setup-bun v2), with the tag recorded in a comment.
Honest limit, recorded in the workflow header: a PR can edit this
workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual attempts,
not a determined author. Branch protection with required checks and
human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop.
Verified locally: positive run passes; injecting Bash(*) into
settings.json, deleting the tracker gitignore rule, and adding a
postinstall script each fail the guard with the intended message, and
reverting restores a clean pass.
* ci: scope dependency-review to upstream PRs - forks lack Dependency graph by default
Verified on a fork: the action fails with 'Dependency review is not
supported on this repository' until Dependency graph is manually enabled,
and forks don't inherit it. Guarded with the same
github.repository == upstream condition the other upstream-only jobs use.
With the graph enabled the action passes, so the config itself is sound.
* ci: probe Dependency graph before dependency-review - warn and pass when unavailable
The upstream PR run showed Dependency graph is disabled on the upstream
repo too (the action hard-fails: 'Dependency review is not supported on
this repository'), not just on forks. Only the repo owner can enable it,
so a hard red X here is friction, not signal.
The job now probes the dependency-graph SBOM endpoint with the workflow
token first: HTTP 200 runs the real review; anything else emits a
::warning:: naming the setting to flip (Settings -> Advanced Security ->
Dependency graph) and passes. Same graceful-skip pattern the workflow
uses for optional tools - the check self-activates the moment the graph
is enabled, no workflow change needed.
Every PR to this repo is currently verified by hand. This adds the checks
a machine can do:
- latex-smoke: compiles cv/main_example.tex (lualatex) and the new
cover_letters/cover_example.tex (xelatex) in the texlive/texlive
container, failing on any LaTeX error. Exact page-count assertions
(CV=2, cover letter=1) run on the upstream repo only
- lint (tools/lint_skills.py, also runnable locally): every SKILL.md has
parseable YAML frontmatter with name+description (frontmatter breakage
happened before - 37a0eed), allowed-tools 'bun run <path>' targets
exist, command files start with a '# /<name>' title, settings.json is
valid JSON with a permissions.allow list
- cli-typecheck: bun install + tsc --noEmit for all five portal CLIs
(matrix, fail-fast off)
- placeholder-integrity (upstream only): tracked template files still
carry their placeholder tokens, catching accidental personal-data
commits before they land
Fork-friendly by design: /setup personalizes CLAUDE.md, the skill files,
and main_example.tex in forks, so placeholder checks and exact page
counts are guarded with github.repository == upstream; compile success
and lint run everywhere. Live CLI smoke tests are deliberately excluded:
network-flaky, and linkedin-search is personal-use-only per its own ToS
warning - CI-automated requests would violate it. CLIs are typechecked
instead.
The cover letter previously had no tracked example (cover_*.tex is
gitignored), so cover_example.tex is new: a placeholder letter following
the documented 06 structure, demonstrating the correct itemize-outside-
lettercontent pattern. It doubles as the structural reference /apply
Step 2 looks for on fresh clones, which until now matched nothing. The
gitignore exception is ordered after Cover_*.tex because case-insensitive
filesystems match that pattern against cover_example.tex too.
Writing it surfaced a latent bug in the documented template itself:
06-cover-letter-templates.md's structure ends with \closing{Kind
regards,\} - but cover.cls appends its own \, and the doubled break
produces '! LaTeX Error: There's no line here to end.' on every compile
(nonstopmode swallows it, so it went unnoticed). Fixed in 06 and noted
in the example.
