* feat(layout): measure compiled PDF layout instead of eyeballing it
/apply Step 5b asks for layout properties and executes none of them: they are
checked by reading the rendered page, which is exactly how they get missed.
The failure that motivates this is silent under every existing check. A moderncv
\cventry renders as a tabular, so an entry is one unbreakable block; when it does
not fit in the space left, the whole entry moves to the next page and leaves a
hole behind. The document still compiles, still reports the expected page count,
and still passes tools/verify_pdf.py. Observed in the wild at 273pt, roughly 19
blank lines, mid-page, on a CV whose visual read looked fine.
tools/verify_layout.py reports per page where the text starts and stops, bottom
whitespace as a share of page height, and the largest gap between lines, then
exits 1 on a hole over 100pt, a non-final page ending more than 25% early, body
text colliding with the page-number footer, a final page more than 35% empty, or
an entry header or section heading stranded at a page break.
Page count is deliberately not checked here - verify_pdf.py --pages already does
that, and two implementations of one rule drift. Geometry comes from Poppler
pdftotext -bbox, already a dependency; a missing Poppler exits 2 with "skipped:"
rather than failing the run.
Tests build synthetic Page/Line geometry, so the suite needs neither Poppler nor
a LaTeX toolchain and runs on the existing 3.10-3.14 matrix.
* fix(layout): survive Windows encoding and a pdftotext without -bbox
Review found two failures on the repo's primary platform:
subprocess.run(..., text=True) decoded pdftotext's UTF-8 output with the
Windows ANSI codepage and crashed on the stock cv/main_example.pdf. It now
passes encoding="utf-8" with errors="replace" at the call site, matching the
fix verify_pdf.py already carries from #369.
Git for Windows ships an xpdf-based pdftotext that shadows Poppler in a
default PATH and has no -bbox flag; it exited 99, the CalledProcessError
escaped, and the run ended in exit 1 - indistinguishable from a real layout
problem, which would send /apply chasing a phantom hole. That now routes to
the existing "skipped:" exit 2 path with a message naming the likely cause,
covered by three tests on the extractor-failure path.
Also from review:
- .claude/settings.json and security_guards.py gain the verify_layout.py
permission entries. apply.md Step 5b runs the tool on every /apply, so
without them every run prompts.
- The docstring and CHANGELOG no longer call Poppler a dependency
verify_pdf.py relies on. Since #369 verify_pdf prefers pypdf and Poppler is
the fallback; word bboxes have no pypdf equivalent, so this is the one step
that still wants it, and that is now what the text says.
- Docstring and apply.md state that the thresholds are calibrated for the
stock moderncv and cover.cls geometry, and that the shipped example CV
fails the thin-final-page rule by design.
- largest_gap documents that it measures top-to-top, so a tall line inflates
the gap by its own height - over-detection, the safe direction.
- The test module imports via tools.verify_layout like test_verify_pdf.py
instead of sys.path.insert.
* fix(verify_layout): quote only the first stderr line in the skip message (#378)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013fqqLgQSnwgWkv98twQhHi
---------
Co-authored-by: Mads Lorentzen <madslorentzen_17@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(scraper): make seen_jobs.json keys a pure function of the posting, and clean up the drift
The dedup key was prose only ("<url_or_company_title_key>"), so different
/scrape runs slugified company+title differently and the state file
accumulated two failures: keys carrying "&", "/", "," and ":" that break
the archive-folder path /apply and /outcome derive from company+role
(documents/README.md's subfolder rule exists because of exactly this),
and the same posting stored twice under two different truncations of a
long title (two Deloitte entries, one job, one URL).
tools/job_key.py makes the key a pure, deterministic function of
company+title+url: a strict allowlist slug, length-capped with a hash of
the full slug so truncation never collides across runs, and a fallback
to the portal's numeric job id when a non-Latin title slugifies to
nothing (a real prior entry, "securion_", would have collided with
every future non-Latin posting from that company).
--audit finds both failure classes in an existing seen_jobs.json without
guessing at a fix: malformed keys (real damage), a legacy three-part
company_title_location shape (harmless but not what the current rule
produces, so it silently re-duplicates on the next scrape), and
duplicate URLs. Ran it against this workspace's file and re-keyed the 15
entries it found - 7 malformed, 8 legacy-shape - verified byte-for-byte
against the pre-cleanup copy that no entry's data changed, only its key.
tests/test_job_key.py (16 tests) covers the slugify rules, the
truncation-hash behavior, both non-Latin fallback paths, and the audit
CLI's exit codes.
* fix(scrape): call the key helper from Step 4 instead of slugifying ad hoc
The helper added in the previous commit is only load-bearing if the spec
calls it. Step 4 described the key as prose ("<url_or_company_title_key>"),
which is what let each run slugify its own way. Step 4 now names the
command, and the schema shows the key's provenance.
Renumbers the trailing list item; no other behaviour in the step changes.
* docs(changelog): record the job-key rule under Unreleased
* fix(scrape): preserve dedup continuity across key rule
* changelog: note that existing seen_jobs.json entries need no migration (#441)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013fqqLgQSnwgWkv98twQhHi
---------
Co-authored-by: nox <nox@Mac.home>
Co-authored-by: Mads Lorentzen <madslorentzen_17@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(rank): move seen_jobs.json read/write off the state file's own critical path (#395)
/rank's Step 1 read the whole of seen_jobs.json into the conversation to
select candidates by eye, and Step 4 emitted it back to record scores.
That cost is paid on every run regardless of how many jobs are scored,
and it grows for the life of the workspace, since the file is
append-only and most stored entries are `skipped`.
tools/rank_state.py moves that traffic into code:
- `candidates` selects entries per Step 1's existing rules (status
filter, tracker exclusion, focus filter, `--limit`/`--all` from #424)
and projects only the fields a scoring agent needs.
- `sweep` runs rule 6's expiry pass over entries the run did not
re-score - a stored-date comparison, no fetch, no agent - preserving
its defensive parsing of non-ISO deadlines and its `--all`
reversibility.
- `apply` writes scoring results back atomically and prints the
ranked/vetoed/expired rows Step 5's report is built from, preserving
Step 4's existing write-back rules exactly: the `location` ->
`location_verdict` legacy migration, the deadline
null-is-not-a-correction rule, verbatim strengths/gaps persistence,
and idempotent re-scoring.
Step 1, Step 3's rule 6, and Step 4 now route through the tool instead
of describing a manual read/write. Nothing about scoring policy changes
- no new status, no new persisted field, no change to what counts as a
veto. The tracker stays read-only and every write is atomic (temp file
+ rename).
tests/test_rank_state.py (25 tests) covers the three subcommands
directly. The new spec-guard class in test_rank_command.py derives the
fields Step 4 must preserve from Step 2's own JSON schema block rather
than retyping them as a second list, so a future edit to that contract
is what the test reads instead of something that can drift from it.
* fix(rank): add CHANGELOG entry and remove the undefined $SCRATCHPAD reference
Two mechanical fixes from review:
- Step 4 named the results hand-off file via $SCRATCHPAD, a variable
nothing in the repo defines - a reader following the spec literally
has no path to substitute. Named the location in prose instead (a
temporary file outside the repo tree, never committed) and replaced
the shell-variable-looking path in the example command with an
explicit placeholder.
- Added the [Unreleased] entry this change was missing; the one
already in the diff belongs to #424.
* changelog: fold the #395 entry into the existing Fixed section
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013fqqLgQSnwgWkv98twQhHi
---------
Co-authored-by: nox <nox@Mac.home>
Co-authored-by: Mads Lorentzen <madslorentzen17@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two-line comment above `documents/interview/**` says interview prep and
experience records live there. Nothing has ever written to that directory:
/interview saves its pack to
documents/applications/<company>_<role>/interview_prep_<stage>.md, covered by
the documents/applications/** rule. `git grep documents/interview` returns
only the two declarations of the rule itself (.gitignore and
REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES), `git log --all -- 'documents/interview*'` is empty,
and documents/README.md documents the applications path outright.
Nothing leaks - the comment is the defect, and it is the misleading kind. It
is the one dedicated, well-argued line about interview material in the
personal-data block, so an auditor checking that the framework's most
sensitive artifact is covered reads it and stops, at the only path in the
block with no writer.
The comment's description of what needs protecting was always right; only its
location was wrong. It now sits above documents/applications/**, the rule that
actually provides that protection, so a reader auditing the block finds the
reasoning attached to the rule doing the work. documents/interview/** stays -
REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES pins it, so dropping it from .gitignore alone turns CI
red, and it is harmless defence in depth - relabelled in both files as
belt-and-braces rather than the primary guard.
The new check-ignore case in GitignorePatternBehaviorTests derives the
prep-pack path from /interview's own spec instead of hardcoding it. That
distinction is the whole value of the test: a hardcoded path pins only that
documents/applications/** still matches that shape, which security_guards.py
already catches first, and stays green if /interview moves its output -
leaving the corrected comment stale exactly the way this issue found it.
Since #329 the spec states the location in two pieces - Step 1 derives the
archive folder, Step 3 names interview_prep_<stage>.md - so the test pins both
fragments separately and composes the concrete path from them. Mutation-
verified on each half: repointing the folder at documents/prep_packs/, and
renaming the file, both fail this test while `python3 tools/security_guards.py`
still reports OK.
The class's temp-repo setup moved to setUp for the second case.
ayobamiseun reviewed the pre-rebase branch and called all three rebase hazards
in advance: the split literal, the released CHANGELOG context, and the setUp
re-merge. Reached independently here during the rebase; the review was posted
first.
The upstream template pre-approves `Bash(bun run:*)`, which auto-approves
`bun run <any file>` — arbitrary TypeScript from anywhere on disk — on every
fork. Each portal SKILL.md already declares the tight form in its own
allowed-tools; this makes settings.json agree with them.
Blast radius drops from "any file on the machine" to the repo's own CLIs,
with no new prompts in the /scrape path. tools/security_guards.py's
ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS is updated in the same commit, as its docstring requires.
Local: security_guards OK, lint_skills OK, 318 tests pass.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HHqEAQqGS2KKXASiYcrAHQ
* feat(ats): extract PDF text with pypdf before Poppler
Lead the ATS text-layer check with pypdf (BSD, optional pip install). Fall back to pdftotext -layout -enc UTF-8. No cache directory, no installer, no AGPL pymupdf. Windows users without Poppler still get a mechanical parseability check; visual review remains the last resort.
* Update verify_pdf.py
* Update apply.md
* Update verify_pdf.py
* Update verify_pdf.py
/apply Step 3's reviewer agent and /interview Step 2 each independently
execute the Company Research Checklist (04-job-evaluation.md) for the
same company - applying to a role and later prepping for its interview
researches the company twice from scratch, same WebSearch/WebFetch cost
both times, no sharing between the two commands.
Adds a company_research/<normalized-name>.json cache (30-day TTL) that
either consumer checks before researching and writes after a fresh
pass. Defined once in 04-job-evaluation.md, next to the checklist it
mirrors, so both commands point at one source instead of restating the
schema. Does not change the verification model: 03-writing-style.md
rule 5 already treats reviewer-agent research as a lead, not a source,
requiring independent re-confirmation before any company claim ships
in a final artifact - the cache stores source URLs alongside each
fact so that re-confirmation stays cheap, but the requirement itself
is untouched and restated in both consumers.
company_research/*.json added to .gitignore and security_guards.py's
REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES as a plain rooted pattern (not **/-prefixed):
the cache is referenced from commands, not a skill, so it resolves
against the repo root normally, unlike job_scraper/upskill's
skill-relative paths.
Pinned by tests/test_company_research_cache.py, mirroring the
spec-pinning pattern in test_rank_command.py and test_onboarding_privacy.py.
The write-back assertions for both apply.md and interview.md were
verified to actually fail against the regression they guard (the
instruction stripped, confirmed the test catches it, restored) before
being considered done - the write half is the one most likely to be
dropped silently in a future edit, since the read half is the more
obvious change to make.
framework_version bumped 1.2.4 -> 1.2.5 in 04-job-evaluation.md, the
only touched file inside the tracked skill set.
The upskill/*.md rule is rooted, but /upskill is a skill and skills
resolve bare relative paths against their own directory - the same
observed behavior the **/job_scraper rules exist for. A report at
.claude/skills/upskill/upskill/report-*.md was not ignored, and an
upskill report records the candidate's skill gaps against named
employers. **/upskill/*.md would also ignore the skill's own SKILL.md
(the directory shares the name), so the new rule pins the report-file
prefix: **/upskill/report-*.md. Added to .gitignore and
REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES, with a check-ignore-based test pinning both
properties.
check_permissions() read permissions.allow and nothing else, so a `hooks`
block in the same file passed the guard silently.
A hook is strictly more dangerous than a pre-approved permission. A
permission pre-approves something Claude may choose to do; a hook runs
unconditionally when its event fires, with no prompt and no model decision
in between. Cloning the repo and opening it is enough.
This is the vector the Shai-Hulud worm used in its August 2026 wave: a
SessionStart hook in .claude/settings.json chaining to .claude/math_init.js,
executing on session start.
https://research.jfrog.com/post/shai-hulud-is-back-august/
For a template that thousands of people are explicitly invited to fork,
that is the riskiest key in the file this guard already parses.
Follows the established pattern exactly - ALLOWED_HOOKS ships empty, since
the template has no hooks, so any addition must be allowlisted in the same
PR and is therefore explicit and reviewable.
Two details worth reviewing closely:
- The hook check runs *before* the permissions shape guards. Those guards
return early, so a file pairing a malformed permissions block with a live
hook would otherwise skip the hook check entirely - a fail-open. Pinned by
test_hook_is_caught_even_when_permissions_block_is_malformed.
- _hook_commands() fails closed. Any hook layout it does not recognise
yields a marker that cannot be in the allowlist, so an unfamiliar shape is
rejected rather than silently skipped, rather than trusting that the
Claude Code schema will not change.
Verified:
- 8 new HookGuardTests cases; 14 of the suite's 26 tests fail against the
unpatched guard, all 26 pass with it
- injecting the real worm shape into this repo's own settings.json makes
the guard exit 1 naming 'SessionStart:node .claude/math_init.js';
removing it returns OK
- lint_skills, check_framework_version, security_guards all OK;
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests 219 passed
/add-portal can generate a skill for a portal that only returns usable
content through a paid fetching service, and such a skill reads its API
token from the environment. Nothing stopped the `.env` holding that token
from being committed: `.gitignore` had no `.env` rule, and
`REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES` in tools/security_guards.py did not pin one.
No shipped portal needs a credential - all six are free and
unauthenticated - so upstream has never hit this. A fork whose generated
portals do need one hits it on the first `git add -A`.
Add `.env` and `.env.*` to `.gitignore`, and pin both in
`REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES` so the guard fails if the rule is later dropped.
No negation rule is added, so `ALLOWED_IGNORE_NEGATIONS` is untouched.
Verified:
- `printf 'X=y' > .env && git check-ignore -v .env` -> matched
- dropping the `.env` line makes `python3 tools/security_guards.py`
report the missing rule and fail; restoring it returns OK
- `lint_skills`, `check_framework_version`, `security_guards` all OK;
`python3 -m unittest discover -s tests` 196 passed
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two personal-data ignore rules existed in .gitignore but not in
REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES, so a change weakening either would have passed CI:
cover_letters/Cover_*.* (the uppercase naming variant /apply recognizes)
and cv/*.txt (ATS text extractions of tailored CVs).
Also: regression tests pinning #252's ragged-row bounds fix in
convert_salary_excel.py (mutation-verified), and removal of the vestigial
cover_letters/OpenFonts/cover.cls, which since #252's rename ambiguously
declared the same class as the real cover.cls (zero references; cover
letter re-compiled and page-verified after removal).
Guard-list gap surfaced by CodeRabbit's review on jakob1379's Nix demo
fork PR (jakob1379/ai-job-search#1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(add-template): make /add-template engine-agnostic so Typst can register alongside LaTeX
/add-template hardcoded a lualatex|xelatex|pdflatex engine enum and .tex
assumptions, so custom templates could only be LaTeX. Replace the enum with a
declared source extension + compile command, so any toolchain (Typst via
`typst compile`, or others) registers the same way stock LaTeX templates did.
Stock CV/cover-letter pipeline stays LaTeX and untouched (per #181).
Also fixes a latent bug this surfaced: apply.md's compile step ignored the
ACTIVE-TEMPLATE block and always ran lualatex/xelatex on .tex regardless of
the active template, and .gitignore's cv/main_*.tex pattern would not have
ignored a non-.tex draft (personal-data leak). Both now resolve from the
declared extension/command.
* fix(add-template): satisfy security_guards on the .gitignore Typst fix
security_guards.py pins the personal-data ignore rules by exact string and
gates negations through an allowlist, so broadening cv/main_*.tex and
cover_letters/cover_*.tex to *.* (for .typ drafts) needed a matching update
to REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES.
Also tighten the .gitignore itself per review: keep the re-include
negations at .tex instead of widening them to *.* too. The stock example
files are always LaTeX, so .tex is enough to re-include them, and a
wildcard negation would have also re-included build artifacts
(main_example.pdf/.aux) that should stay ignored. ALLOWED_IGNORE_NEGATIONS
needs no change since the negations are unchanged.
Also adds a CHANGELOG entry under Unreleased for the Typst/custom-template
support.
job_scraper/seen_jobs.json (and notion_sync.json / *.md) were ignored by a repo-rooted pattern, but the job-scraper skill resolves job_scraper/ relative to its own directory, so the state file lands at .claude/skills/job-scraper/job_scraper/ and the rule never matched - publishing every scraped posting with fit scores and skip-reasons on a public fork. Switches to **/-prefixed patterns that match at any depth (the rooted location still matches too, so no regression), and adds documents/interview/** (interview prep names employers, quotes submitted material, and lists the candidate's weak points) - it was never ignored though documents/applications/** was. REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES updated in lockstep so the security guard stays in sync.
By @LeoWinston-9596 (split from #199). Verified: both nested and root seen_jobs.json now ignored, interview records ignored, guard suite green (17 tests incl. #195's negation checks). Rebased cleanly on current master.
check_gitignore() verified each required personal-data rule was present via set membership, but .gitignore is order-sensitive: a later !pattern re-includes a file an earlier rule excluded, so the required line stays physically present while the file is no longer ignored - the guard failed open on exactly the weakening its docstring claims to catch. Keeps the required-rules-present check and additionally rejects any negation line outside a small reviewed ALLOWED_IGNORE_NEGATIONS allowlist (same explicit-widening pattern as ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS). Fixes#194.
By @thejesh23. Verified: allowlist matches the four negations currently in .gitignore; guard test suite passes locally (17 tests) and in CI.
Closes#194
* ci: add supply-chain guards - permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifest checks, pinned actions
This template's threat model is unusual: it ships pre-approved Claude Code
permissions (.claude/settings.json) and CLI code that every fork user
executes via those permissions. A plausible-looking PR could therefore
ship risk to every forker: widen a permission to Bash(*), weaken the
personal-data gitignore rules, or smuggle code execution into bun install
via a lifecycle script. Nothing checked for these mechanically.
New job security-guards runs tools/security_guards.py (stdlib only):
- settings.json: every permissions.allow entry must be in an exact,
in-repo allowlist. The guard makes permission changes loud, not
impossible - a PR that intentionally widens permissions must update
the allowlist in the same diff, so the widening is explicit and
reviewable
- .gitignore: the personal-data rules (tracker, documents/**, cv/main_*,
salary data, seen_jobs) must all still be present - the mirror image
of the placeholder-integrity job
- .agents/**/package.json: no lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/
postinstall/prepare/prepack) and no trustedDependencies, which would
execute arbitrary code during bun install on users' machines
New job dependency-review (PRs only): actions/dependency-review-action
flags newly introduced vulnerable or malicious dependencies,
fail-on-severity high.
Workflow hardening: explicit top-level permissions: contents: read
(least-privilege token), and all actions pinned to commit SHAs resolved
from the same major tags already in use (checkout v4, setup-python v5,
setup-bun v2), with the tag recorded in a comment.
Honest limit, recorded in the workflow header: a PR can edit this
workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual attempts,
not a determined author. Branch protection with required checks and
human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop.
Verified locally: positive run passes; injecting Bash(*) into
settings.json, deleting the tracker gitignore rule, and adding a
postinstall script each fail the guard with the intended message, and
reverting restores a clean pass.
* ci: scope dependency-review to upstream PRs - forks lack Dependency graph by default
Verified on a fork: the action fails with 'Dependency review is not
supported on this repository' until Dependency graph is manually enabled,
and forks don't inherit it. Guarded with the same
github.repository == upstream condition the other upstream-only jobs use.
With the graph enabled the action passes, so the config itself is sound.
* ci: probe Dependency graph before dependency-review - warn and pass when unavailable
The upstream PR run showed Dependency graph is disabled on the upstream
repo too (the action hard-fails: 'Dependency review is not supported on
this repository'), not just on forks. Only the repo owner can enable it,
so a hard red X here is friction, not signal.
The job now probes the dependency-graph SBOM endpoint with the workflow
token first: HTTP 200 runs the real review; anything else emits a
::warning:: naming the setting to flip (Settings -> Advanced Security ->
Dependency graph) and passes. Same graceful-skip pattern the workflow
uses for optional tools - the check self-activates the moment the graph
is enabled, no workflow change needed.
