GitHub Sponsors profile for @MadsLorentzen is now live and accepting
sponsorships. Add it to FUNDING.yml so the repo's native "Sponsor this
project" box links to both GitHub Sponsors and Ko-fi, meeting developer
and non-developer supporters on whichever path is lowest-friction for
them. Ko-fi remains unchanged; the README Ko-fi block is untouched.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three personalized-fork PRs (#155, #162, #165) were filed against
upstream by accident in one week - GitHub points new fork PRs at the
upstream repo by default, and nothing warned about it at the moment of
filing. Adds a PR template with the heads-up in the compose box (plus
the review norms the process asks for anyway) and one sentence in
CONTRIBUTING's fork section naming the mechanism.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add framework_version markers to assistant skills and implement CI version guard and update checker
* Address review feedback: update ci.yml based on latest upstream, gate CI version guard to upstream repo, and remove non-ASCII characters from check_upstream_updates.py
* ci: run the Python test suite - CONTRIBUTING.md asks for tests CI never executes
CONTRIBUTING.md tells contributors to put Python tool tests in tests/
and run the relevant suites, and tests/ now holds real ones
(test_salary_lookup.py, test_convert_salary_excel.py from #75) - but no
CI job executes them. A suite that never runs in CI can't gate a PR and
silently rots. New python-tests job: unittest discover over tests/,
stdlib only, no new dependencies. Future test files run without any
workflow change.
Also lands tests/test_security_guards.py, which missed #84's merge
window (pushed to the branch as #84 was being merged; the merge took
2a6cb8c, the tests were 260c37a). 13 unittest cases in the existing
tests/ style: each copies the guard script into a synthetic repo tree
and runs it as a subprocess - the same way CI invokes it - asserting
real exit codes and messages. Every forbidden state fails (Bash(*) and
Bash(curl:*) additions, each personal-data gitignore rule removed one
at a time, each forbidden lifecycle script, trustedDependencies,
invalid settings JSON, zero manifests); every non-event passes (dropped
shipped permission, extra ignore rules, benign scripts, hostile
manifest inside node_modules); and the real repo passes its own guards.
22 tests total, all passing locally via the exact command the job runs.
* test: use benign lifecycle-script values in fixtures - AV heuristics flag attack-shaped strings
Review found the curl-pipe-to-sh fixture value matches a real Defender
signature (Trojan:Script/Stealer.HAX!MTB): Windows quarantines the temp
package.json mid-test, making the suite flaky for any Windows
contributor who runs it - while proving nothing extra, since the guard
flags the script KEY and never inspects the value.
Fixture values are now 'echo test' (also in the node_modules-ignored
test, same class of string), with a comment on the key-only test
explaining why the value must stay benign so a future 'make the fixture
realistic' cleanup doesn't reintroduce the quarantine flake. Coverage
is unchanged: same keys, same assertions, 13 tests passing.
* feat(freehire-search): add country-agnostic freehire.dev aggregator skill
Adds a portal-search skill over the freehire.dev public JSON API — an
open-source IT job aggregator normalizing ~50 ATS platforms across many
markets into one schema. Like linkedin-search it is country-agnostic and
zero-dependency (plain bun + fetch), but it queries a JSON API rather than
scraping HTML, so results carry structured facets (skills/seniority/region).
Honors the portal-skill contract: search + detail commands, --format
json|table|plain, stderr JSON errors with exit 1, backoff on 429/5xx. Reads
are public (no API key) — the same zero-signup bar as linkedin-search. The
hosted-service dependency (best-effort, no SLA) is labeled prominently in
SKILL.md, and FREEHIRE_API_URL swaps the base URL for a self-hosted backend.
Scoped tech-first: triggers cover software/data/engineering roles, where the
faceted filtering is strong; non-tech coverage exists but is still maturing.
Network-free tests (mocked fetch + pure reshape/parse functions); CI matrix
updated to typecheck the new CLI.
* refactor(freehire-search): clarity pass on cli flag parsing
No behavior change. Replace a nested ternary and a comma-operator side effect
in a ternary with explicit if/else, and fix a comment that described facets
while sitting on the alias map.
* refactor(freehire-search): tighten to boundary contracts, trim comments
- Validate/normalize at boundaries, trust the declared types inside: drop the
redundant '?? []' guards on facet arrays the wire contract already guarantees,
and the re-filter in buildQuery (commaList already stripped empties).
- Model enrichment as always-present (an unenriched job serializes it as {}),
removing the '?? {}' guard.
- Replace the positional table-row builder with a declarative column list; add a
shared shortDate and a labeled-field helper for detail's plain output.
- Extract stringFlag for the string-or-bare-boolean flags (--remote/--query/...).
- Dedup the response parse in apiGet to a single tolerant read (drop safeJson).
- SKILL.md: document partial data + the 'none' unspecified-region facet.
- Trim restating comments to the reference skills' density.
* ci: add supply-chain guards - permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifest checks, pinned actions
This template's threat model is unusual: it ships pre-approved Claude Code
permissions (.claude/settings.json) and CLI code that every fork user
executes via those permissions. A plausible-looking PR could therefore
ship risk to every forker: widen a permission to Bash(*), weaken the
personal-data gitignore rules, or smuggle code execution into bun install
via a lifecycle script. Nothing checked for these mechanically.
New job security-guards runs tools/security_guards.py (stdlib only):
- settings.json: every permissions.allow entry must be in an exact,
in-repo allowlist. The guard makes permission changes loud, not
impossible - a PR that intentionally widens permissions must update
the allowlist in the same diff, so the widening is explicit and
reviewable
- .gitignore: the personal-data rules (tracker, documents/**, cv/main_*,
salary data, seen_jobs) must all still be present - the mirror image
of the placeholder-integrity job
- .agents/**/package.json: no lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/
postinstall/prepare/prepack) and no trustedDependencies, which would
execute arbitrary code during bun install on users' machines
New job dependency-review (PRs only): actions/dependency-review-action
flags newly introduced vulnerable or malicious dependencies,
fail-on-severity high.
Workflow hardening: explicit top-level permissions: contents: read
(least-privilege token), and all actions pinned to commit SHAs resolved
from the same major tags already in use (checkout v4, setup-python v5,
setup-bun v2), with the tag recorded in a comment.
Honest limit, recorded in the workflow header: a PR can edit this
workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual attempts,
not a determined author. Branch protection with required checks and
human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop.
Verified locally: positive run passes; injecting Bash(*) into
settings.json, deleting the tracker gitignore rule, and adding a
postinstall script each fail the guard with the intended message, and
reverting restores a clean pass.
* ci: scope dependency-review to upstream PRs - forks lack Dependency graph by default
Verified on a fork: the action fails with 'Dependency review is not
supported on this repository' until Dependency graph is manually enabled,
and forks don't inherit it. Guarded with the same
github.repository == upstream condition the other upstream-only jobs use.
With the graph enabled the action passes, so the config itself is sound.
* ci: probe Dependency graph before dependency-review - warn and pass when unavailable
The upstream PR run showed Dependency graph is disabled on the upstream
repo too (the action hard-fails: 'Dependency review is not supported on
this repository'), not just on forks. Only the repo owner can enable it,
so a hard red X here is friction, not signal.
The job now probes the dependency-graph SBOM endpoint with the workflow
token first: HTTP 200 runs the real review; anything else emits a
::warning:: naming the setting to flip (Settings -> Advanced Security ->
Dependency graph) and passes. Same graceful-skip pattern the workflow
uses for optional tools - the check self-activates the moment the graph
is enabled, no workflow change needed.
Every PR to this repo is currently verified by hand. This adds the checks
a machine can do:
- latex-smoke: compiles cv/main_example.tex (lualatex) and the new
cover_letters/cover_example.tex (xelatex) in the texlive/texlive
container, failing on any LaTeX error. Exact page-count assertions
(CV=2, cover letter=1) run on the upstream repo only
- lint (tools/lint_skills.py, also runnable locally): every SKILL.md has
parseable YAML frontmatter with name+description (frontmatter breakage
happened before - 37a0eed), allowed-tools 'bun run <path>' targets
exist, command files start with a '# /<name>' title, settings.json is
valid JSON with a permissions.allow list
- cli-typecheck: bun install + tsc --noEmit for all five portal CLIs
(matrix, fail-fast off)
- placeholder-integrity (upstream only): tracked template files still
carry their placeholder tokens, catching accidental personal-data
commits before they land
Fork-friendly by design: /setup personalizes CLAUDE.md, the skill files,
and main_example.tex in forks, so placeholder checks and exact page
counts are guarded with github.repository == upstream; compile success
and lint run everywhere. Live CLI smoke tests are deliberately excluded:
network-flaky, and linkedin-search is personal-use-only per its own ToS
warning - CI-automated requests would violate it. CLIs are typechecked
instead.
The cover letter previously had no tracked example (cover_*.tex is
gitignored), so cover_example.tex is new: a placeholder letter following
the documented 06 structure, demonstrating the correct itemize-outside-
lettercontent pattern. It doubles as the structural reference /apply
Step 2 looks for on fresh clones, which until now matched nothing. The
gitignore exception is ordered after Cover_*.tex because case-insensitive
filesystems match that pattern against cover_example.tex too.
Writing it surfaced a latent bug in the documented template itself:
06-cover-letter-templates.md's structure ends with \closing{Kind
regards,\} - but cover.cls appends its own \, and the doubled break
produces '! LaTeX Error: There's no line here to end.' on every compile
(nonstopmode swallows it, so it went unnoticed). Fixed in 06 and noted
in the example.
