This template's threat model is unusual: it ships pre-approved Claude Code
permissions (.claude/settings.json) and CLI code that every fork user
executes via those permissions. A plausible-looking PR could therefore
ship risk to every forker: widen a permission to Bash(*), weaken the
personal-data gitignore rules, or smuggle code execution into bun install
via a lifecycle script. Nothing checked for these mechanically.
New job security-guards runs tools/security_guards.py (stdlib only):
- settings.json: every permissions.allow entry must be in an exact,
in-repo allowlist. The guard makes permission changes loud, not
impossible - a PR that intentionally widens permissions must update
the allowlist in the same diff, so the widening is explicit and
reviewable
- .gitignore: the personal-data rules (tracker, documents/**, cv/main_*,
salary data, seen_jobs) must all still be present - the mirror image
of the placeholder-integrity job
- .agents/**/package.json: no lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/
postinstall/prepare/prepack) and no trustedDependencies, which would
execute arbitrary code during bun install on users' machines
New job dependency-review (PRs only): actions/dependency-review-action
flags newly introduced vulnerable or malicious dependencies,
fail-on-severity high.
Workflow hardening: explicit top-level permissions: contents: read
(least-privilege token), and all actions pinned to commit SHAs resolved
from the same major tags already in use (checkout v4, setup-python v5,
setup-bun v2), with the tag recorded in a comment.
Honest limit, recorded in the workflow header: a PR can edit this
workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual attempts,
not a determined author. Branch protection with required checks and
human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop.
Verified locally: positive run passes; injecting Bash(*) into
settings.json, deleting the tracker gitignore rule, and adding a
postinstall script each fail the guard with the intended message, and
reverting restores a clean pass.
- Untrack job_search_tracker.csv: it was both tracked and listed in
.gitignore (same inconsistency class as the settings.local.json fix
in #27). Users' personal rows risked merge conflicts on every pull;
commands already create the file with the standard header when it
is missing.
- Scope job-scraper's allowed-tools Bash entry (from #52) to
'bun --version' and the portal-CLI invocation pattern, adopting the
tighter form proposed in #65.
- Fix all five portal SKILL.mds documenting 'bun run skills/...'
paths that do not resolve from the repo root ('.agents/skills/...'
is correct) - now load-bearing since #52 wired /scrape to read
these docs for CLI invocations. Surfaced in #66.
- Teach tools/lint_skills.py to glob-expand allowed-tools bun run
targets so scoped wildcard permissions lint correctly.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every PR to this repo is currently verified by hand. This adds the checks
a machine can do:
- latex-smoke: compiles cv/main_example.tex (lualatex) and the new
cover_letters/cover_example.tex (xelatex) in the texlive/texlive
container, failing on any LaTeX error. Exact page-count assertions
(CV=2, cover letter=1) run on the upstream repo only
- lint (tools/lint_skills.py, also runnable locally): every SKILL.md has
parseable YAML frontmatter with name+description (frontmatter breakage
happened before - 37a0eed), allowed-tools 'bun run <path>' targets
exist, command files start with a '# /<name>' title, settings.json is
valid JSON with a permissions.allow list
- cli-typecheck: bun install + tsc --noEmit for all five portal CLIs
(matrix, fail-fast off)
- placeholder-integrity (upstream only): tracked template files still
carry their placeholder tokens, catching accidental personal-data
commits before they land
Fork-friendly by design: /setup personalizes CLAUDE.md, the skill files,
and main_example.tex in forks, so placeholder checks and exact page
counts are guarded with github.repository == upstream; compile success
and lint run everywhere. Live CLI smoke tests are deliberately excluded:
network-flaky, and linkedin-search is personal-use-only per its own ToS
warning - CI-automated requests would violate it. CLIs are typechecked
instead.
The cover letter previously had no tracked example (cover_*.tex is
gitignored), so cover_example.tex is new: a placeholder letter following
the documented 06 structure, demonstrating the correct itemize-outside-
lettercontent pattern. It doubles as the structural reference /apply
Step 2 looks for on fresh clones, which until now matched nothing. The
gitignore exception is ordered after Cover_*.tex because case-insensitive
filesystems match that pattern against cover_example.tex too.
Writing it surfaced a latent bug in the documented template itself:
06-cover-letter-templates.md's structure ends with \closing{Kind
regards,\} - but cover.cls appends its own \, and the doubled break
produces '! LaTeX Error: There's no line here to end.' on every compile
(nonstopmode swallows it, so it went unnoticed). Fixed in 06 and noted
in the example.
ayobamiseun