security: treat job postings as untrusted input across /apply and /rank (#175)

Prompt-injection hardening from the dataflow analysis in #173 by @Defaultuser361: data-not-instructions rules in /apply and /rank, reviewer research constrained to the user-confirmed company identity, writing-style verify rule tightened to independently located sources (framework_version 1.1.0), SECURITY.md private reporting channel, README note. Closes #173.
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Mads Lorentzen
2026-07-17 21:48:59 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent ac6a734e16
commit fb91be7a0b
6 changed files with 37 additions and 8 deletions
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@@ -131,6 +131,8 @@ If the URL can't be fetched (some job portals block automated access), you can p
This runs the full workflow: evaluate fit, draft CV + cover letter, review with a second agent, revise, and present the final output.
Postings are treated as untrusted input (the workflow follows no instructions embedded in them and fetches no links from their body), but agentic defenses are instruction-level, not a sandbox - on an unfamiliar job board, skim what was fetched and written before you hit send. Details in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
## Other commands
`/setup`, `/scrape`, and `/apply` form the core workflow. Nine more commands extend it once your profile is in place: