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security: treat job postings as untrusted input across /apply and /rank (#175)
Prompt-injection hardening from the dataflow analysis in #173 by @Defaultuser361: data-not-instructions rules in /apply and /rank, reviewer research constrained to the user-confirmed company identity, writing-style verify rule tightened to independently located sources (framework_version 1.1.0), SECURITY.md private reporting channel, README note. Closes #173.
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@@ -131,6 +131,8 @@ If the URL can't be fetched (some job portals block automated access), you can p
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This runs the full workflow: evaluate fit, draft CV + cover letter, review with a second agent, revise, and present the final output.
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Postings are treated as untrusted input (the workflow follows no instructions embedded in them and fetches no links from their body), but agentic defenses are instruction-level, not a sandbox - on an unfamiliar job board, skim what was fetched and written before you hit send. Details in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
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## Other commands
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`/setup`, `/scrape`, and `/apply` form the core workflow. Nine more commands extend it once your profile is in place:
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