ci: add supply-chain guards - permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifest checks, pinned actions

This template's threat model is unusual: it ships pre-approved Claude Code
permissions (.claude/settings.json) and CLI code that every fork user
executes via those permissions. A plausible-looking PR could therefore
ship risk to every forker: widen a permission to Bash(*), weaken the
personal-data gitignore rules, or smuggle code execution into bun install
via a lifecycle script. Nothing checked for these mechanically.

New job security-guards runs tools/security_guards.py (stdlib only):

- settings.json: every permissions.allow entry must be in an exact,
  in-repo allowlist. The guard makes permission changes loud, not
  impossible - a PR that intentionally widens permissions must update
  the allowlist in the same diff, so the widening is explicit and
  reviewable
- .gitignore: the personal-data rules (tracker, documents/**, cv/main_*,
  salary data, seen_jobs) must all still be present - the mirror image
  of the placeholder-integrity job
- .agents/**/package.json: no lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/
  postinstall/prepare/prepack) and no trustedDependencies, which would
  execute arbitrary code during bun install on users' machines

New job dependency-review (PRs only): actions/dependency-review-action
flags newly introduced vulnerable or malicious dependencies,
fail-on-severity high.

Workflow hardening: explicit top-level permissions: contents: read
(least-privilege token), and all actions pinned to commit SHAs resolved
from the same major tags already in use (checkout v4, setup-python v5,
setup-bun v2), with the tag recorded in a comment.

Honest limit, recorded in the workflow header: a PR can edit this
workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual attempts,
not a determined author. Branch protection with required checks and
human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop.

Verified locally: positive run passes; injecting Bash(*) into
settings.json, deleting the tracker gitignore rule, and adding a
postinstall script each fail the guard with the intended message, and
reverting restores a clean pass.

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@
 # real portals (network-flaky, and the linkedin-search skill is personal-use
 # only per its own ToS warning - CI-automated requests would violate that).
 # CLIs get typechecked instead; live testing stays a local, on-demand step.
+#
+# Security posture: this template ships pre-approved Claude Code permissions
+# and CLI code that every fork user executes, so the security-guards job
+# fails PRs that widen settings.json permissions, weaken the personal-data
+# gitignore rules, or add package lifecycle scripts; dependency-review flags
+# newly introduced vulnerable/malicious dependencies. Honest limit: a PR can
+# edit this workflow itself, so these guards catch accidents and casual
+# attempts, not a determined author - branch protection with required checks
+# and human review of workflow/settings diffs remain the real backstop.
+# Actions are pinned to commit SHAs; the token is read-only.
 
 name: CI
 
@@ -19,24 +29,47 @@ on:
   pull_request:
   workflow_dispatch:
 
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
   lint:
     name: Lint skills, commands, settings
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
-      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
       - run: pip install pyyaml
       - run: python tools/lint_skills.py
 
+  security-guards:
+    name: Security guards (permissions, gitignore, manifests)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - run: python tools/security_guards.py
+
+  dependency-review:
+    name: Dependency review
+    if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+      - uses: actions/dependency-review-action@2031cfc080254a8a887f58cffee85186f0e49e48 # v4.9.0
+        with:
+          fail-on-severity: high
+
   latex-smoke:
     name: Compile example CV and cover letter
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     container: texlive/texlive:latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
       - name: Compile CV example (lualatex)
         run: |
           cd cv
@@ -78,8 +111,8 @@ jobs:
           - jobnet-search
           - linkedin-search
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
-      - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@v2
+      - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2
       - run: bun install
         working-directory: .agents/skills/${{ matrix.tool }}/cli
       - run: bun run typecheck
@@ -90,7 +123,7 @@ jobs:
     if: github.repository == 'MadsLorentzen/ai-job-search'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
       - name: Tracked template files must keep their placeholder tokens
         run: |
           fail=0

README.md

@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ ai-job-search/
 ├── tools/
 │   ├── convert_salary_excel.py        # Convert salary Excel to JSON
 │   ├── lint_skills.py                 # CI lint for skills, commands, settings.json
+│   ├── security_guards.py             # CI guards: permission allowlist, gitignore rules, manifests
 │   └── README_SALARY_TOOL.md          # Salary tool setup instructions
 ├── job_scraper/                       # Scraper state (seen jobs, results)
 ├── upskill/                           # /upskill report output (markdown reports per run)

tools/security_guards.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Supply-chain guards for the template's riskiest surfaces.
+
+Run from anywhere: python tools/security_guards.py
+
+This repo ships pre-approved Claude Code permissions and CLI code that every
+fork user executes. These guards make the dangerous changes LOUD, not
+impossible: a PR that intentionally needs one of them must update the
+allowlists in this file in the same diff, so the change is explicit and
+reviewable rather than buried.
+
+Checks:
+1. .claude/settings.json — every permissions.allow entry must be in the exact
+   allowlist below. Catches permission widening (e.g. Bash(*), Bash(curl:*)),
+   which would auto-approve commands on every fork.
+2. .gitignore — the personal-data ignore rules must all still be present.
+   Catches weakening that would make future users silently commit their
+   tracker, profile exports, or application archives.
+3. .agents/**/package.json — no npm/bun lifecycle scripts (preinstall,
+   install, postinstall, prepare, prepack) and no trustedDependencies.
+   Catches code execution smuggled into `bun install`.
+
+Stdlib only. Exit 0 on success, 1 with a failure list otherwise.
+"""
+
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+errors: list[str] = []
+
+# The exact permission entries the template ships. A PR that adds or changes
+# an entry must add it here too - that is the point: the diff shows both.
+ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS = {
+    "Skill(job-application-assistant)",
+    "Bash(bun run:*)",
+    "Bash(python salary_lookup.py:*)",
+    "Bash(python3 salary_lookup.py:*)",
+    "Bash(pdftotext:*)",
+}
+
+# Personal-data ignore rules that must never disappear from .gitignore.
+REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES = [
+    "salary_data.json",
+    "job_scraper/seen_jobs.json",
+    "cv/main_*.tex",
+    "!cv/main_example.tex",
+    "cover_letters/cover_*.tex",
+    "documents/cv/**",
+    "documents/linkedin/**",
+    "documents/diplomas/**",
+    "documents/references/**",
+    "documents/applications/**",
+    "job_search_tracker.csv",
+]
+
+FORBIDDEN_SCRIPTS = {"preinstall", "install", "postinstall", "prepare", "prepack"}
+
+
+def check_permissions() -> None:
+    path = ROOT / ".claude" / "settings.json"
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        errors.append(f".claude/settings.json: unreadable or invalid JSON: {exc}")
+        return
+    allow = data.get("permissions", {}).get("allow", [])
+    for entry in allow:
+        if entry not in ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS:
+            errors.append(
+                f".claude/settings.json: permission not in the reviewed allowlist: {entry!r}. "
+                "Pre-approved permissions run without prompting on every fork. If this entry is "
+                "intentional, add it to ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS in tools/security_guards.py in the "
+                "same PR so the widening is explicit and reviewable."
+            )
+    for entry in ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS - set(allow):
+        # Not an error: settings may legitimately drop an entry. But an
+        # allowlist entry that no longer exists should be pruned.
+        print(f"note: allowlisted permission not present in settings.json: {entry!r}")
+
+
+def check_gitignore() -> None:
+    path = ROOT / ".gitignore"
+    try:
+        rules = {line.strip() for line in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()}
+    except OSError as exc:
+        errors.append(f".gitignore: unreadable: {exc}")
+        return
+    for rule in REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES:
+        if rule not in rules:
+            errors.append(
+                f".gitignore: required personal-data rule missing: {rule!r}. "
+                "These rules keep fork users from committing personal data. If the rule moved "
+                "or was renamed intentionally, update REQUIRED_IGNORE_RULES in "
+                "tools/security_guards.py in the same PR."
+            )
+
+
+def check_package_manifests() -> None:
+    manifests = [
+        p for p in ROOT.glob(".agents/**/package.json") if "node_modules" not in p.parts
+    ]
+    if not manifests:
+        errors.append(".agents: no package.json files found - glob roots are wrong or the tree moved")
+    for manifest in manifests:
+        relpath = manifest.relative_to(ROOT)
+        try:
+            data = json.loads(manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            errors.append(f"{relpath}: unreadable or invalid JSON: {exc}")
+            continue
+        bad = FORBIDDEN_SCRIPTS & set(data.get("scripts", {}))
+        if bad:
+            errors.append(
+                f"{relpath}: lifecycle script(s) {sorted(bad)} are forbidden - they execute "
+                "arbitrary code during `bun install` on every fork user's machine."
+            )
+        if "trustedDependencies" in data:
+            errors.append(
+                f"{relpath}: trustedDependencies is forbidden - it re-enables dependency "
+                "lifecycle scripts that bun blocks by default."
+            )
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    check_permissions()
+    check_gitignore()
+    check_package_manifests()
+    if errors:
+        print(f"security_guards: {len(errors)} failure(s)")
+        for err in errors:
+            print(f"  - {err}")
+        return 1
+    print("security_guards: OK (permissions allowlist, gitignore rules, package manifests)")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())