mirror of
https://github.com/sonr-io/sonr.git
synced 2026-08-04 10:21:40 +00:00
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package webauthn
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import (
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"crypto/subtle"
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"fmt"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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)
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// CollectedClientData represents the contextual bindings of both the WebAuthn Relying Party
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// and the client. It is a key-value mapping whose keys are strings. Values can be any type
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// that has a valid encoding in JSON. Its structure is defined by the following Web IDL.
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//
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// Specification: §5.8.1. Client Data Used in WebAuthn Signatures (https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#dictdef-collectedclientdata)
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type CollectedClientData struct {
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// Type the string "webauthn.create" when creating new credentials,
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// and "webauthn.get" when getting an assertion from an existing credential. The
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// purpose of this member is to prevent certain types of signature confusion attacks
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// (where an attacker substitutes one legitimate signature for another).
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Type CeremonyType `json:"type"`
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Challenge string `json:"challenge"`
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Origin string `json:"origin"`
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TopOrigin string `json:"topOrigin,omitempty"`
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CrossOrigin bool `json:"crossOrigin,omitempty"`
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TokenBinding *TokenBinding `json:"tokenBinding,omitempty"`
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// Chromium (Chrome) returns a hint sometimes about how to handle clientDataJSON in a safe manner.
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Hint string `json:"new_keys_may_be_added_here,omitempty"`
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}
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type CeremonyType string
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const (
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CreateCeremony CeremonyType = "webauthn.create"
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AssertCeremony CeremonyType = "webauthn.get"
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)
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type TokenBinding struct {
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Status TokenBindingStatus `json:"status"`
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ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
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}
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type TokenBindingStatus string
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const (
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// Present indicates token binding was used when communicating with the
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// Relying Party. In this case, the id member MUST be present.
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Present TokenBindingStatus = "present"
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// Supported indicates token binding was used when communicating with the
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// negotiated when communicating with the Relying Party.
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Supported TokenBindingStatus = "supported"
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// NotSupported indicates token binding not supported
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// when communicating with the Relying Party.
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NotSupported TokenBindingStatus = "not-supported"
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)
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// FullyQualifiedOrigin returns the origin per the HTML spec: (scheme)://(host)[:(port)].
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func FullyQualifiedOrigin(rawOrigin string) (fqOrigin string, err error) {
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if strings.HasPrefix(rawOrigin, "android:apk-key-hash:") {
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return rawOrigin, nil
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}
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var origin *url.URL
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if origin, err = url.ParseRequestURI(rawOrigin); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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if origin.Host == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("url '%s' does not have a host", rawOrigin)
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}
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origin.Path, origin.RawPath, origin.RawQuery, origin.User = "", "", "", nil
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return origin.String(), nil
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}
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// Verify handles steps 3 through 6 of verifying the registering client data of a
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// new credential and steps 7 through 10 of verifying an authentication assertion
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// See https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#registering-a-new-credential
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// and https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#verifying-assertion
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//
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// Note: the rpTopOriginsVerify parameter does not accept the TopOriginVerificationMode value of
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// TopOriginDefaultVerificationMode as it's expected this value is updated by the config validation process.
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func (c *CollectedClientData) Verify(
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storedChallenge string,
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ceremony CeremonyType,
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rpOrigins, rpTopOrigins []string,
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rpTopOriginsVerify TopOriginVerificationMode,
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) (err error) {
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// Registration Step 3. Verify that the value of C.type is webauthn.create.
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// Assertion Step 7. Verify that the value of C.type is the string webauthn.get.
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if c.Type != ceremony {
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return ErrVerification.WithDetails("Error validating ceremony type").
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WithInfo(fmt.Sprintf("Expected Value: %s, Received: %s", ceremony, c.Type))
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}
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// Registration Step 4. Verify that the value of C.challenge matches the challenge
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// that was sent to the authenticator in the create() call.
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// Assertion Step 8. Verify that the value of C.challenge matches the challenge
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// that was sent to the authenticator in the PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions
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// passed to the get() call.
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challenge := c.Challenge
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(storedChallenge), []byte(challenge)) != 1 {
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return ErrVerification.
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WithDetails("Error validating challenge").
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WithInfo(fmt.Sprintf("Expected b Value: %#v\nReceived b: %#v\n", storedChallenge, challenge))
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}
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// Registration Step 5 & Assertion Step 9. Verify that the value of C.origin matches
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// the Relying Party's origin.
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var fqOrigin string
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if fqOrigin, err = FullyQualifiedOrigin(c.Origin); err != nil {
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return ErrParsingData.WithDetails("Error decoding clientData origin as URL").WithError(err)
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}
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found := false
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for _, origin := range rpOrigins {
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if strings.EqualFold(fqOrigin, origin) {
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found = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !found {
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return ErrVerification.
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WithDetails("Error validating origin").
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WithInfo(fmt.Sprintf("Expected Values: %s, Received: %s", rpOrigins, fqOrigin))
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}
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if rpTopOriginsVerify != TopOriginIgnoreVerificationMode {
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switch len(c.TopOrigin) {
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case 0:
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break
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default:
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if !c.CrossOrigin {
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return ErrVerification.
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WithDetails("Error validating topOrigin").
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WithInfo("The topOrigin can't have values unless crossOrigin is true.")
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}
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var (
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fqTopOrigin string
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possibleTopOrigins []string
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)
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if fqTopOrigin, err = FullyQualifiedOrigin(c.TopOrigin); err != nil {
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return ErrParsingData.WithDetails("Error decoding clientData topOrigin as URL").
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WithError(err)
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}
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switch rpTopOriginsVerify {
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case TopOriginExplicitVerificationMode:
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possibleTopOrigins = rpTopOrigins
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case TopOriginAutoVerificationMode:
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possibleTopOrigins = append(rpTopOrigins, rpOrigins...)
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case TopOriginImplicitVerificationMode:
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possibleTopOrigins = rpOrigins
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default:
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return ErrNotImplemented.WithDetails(
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"Error handling unknown Top Origin verification mode",
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)
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}
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found = false
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for _, origin := range possibleTopOrigins {
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if strings.EqualFold(fqTopOrigin, origin) {
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found = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !found {
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return ErrVerification.
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WithDetails("Error validating top origin").
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WithInfo(fmt.Sprintf("Expected Values: %s, Received: %s", possibleTopOrigins, fqTopOrigin))
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}
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}
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}
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// Registration Step 6 and Assertion Step 10. Verify that the value of C.tokenBinding.status
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// matches the state of Token Binding for the TLS connection over which the assertion was
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// obtained. If Token Binding was used on that TLS connection, also verify that C.tokenBinding.id
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// matches the base64url encoding of the Token Binding ID for the connection.
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if c.TokenBinding != nil {
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if c.TokenBinding.Status == "" {
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return ErrParsingData.WithDetails(
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"Error decoding clientData, token binding present without status",
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)
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}
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if c.TokenBinding.Status != Present && c.TokenBinding.Status != Supported &&
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c.TokenBinding.Status != NotSupported {
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return ErrParsingData.
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WithDetails("Error decoding clientData, token binding present with invalid status").
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WithInfo(fmt.Sprintf("Got: %s", c.TokenBinding.Status))
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}
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}
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// Not yet fully implemented by the spec, browsers, and me.
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return nil
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}
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type TopOriginVerificationMode int
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const (
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// TopOriginDefaultVerificationMode represents the default verification mode for the Top Origin. At this time this
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// mode is the same as TopOriginIgnoreVerificationMode until such a time as the specification becomes stable. This
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// value is intended as a fallback value and implementers should very intentionally pick another option if they want
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// stability.
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TopOriginDefaultVerificationMode TopOriginVerificationMode = iota
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// TopOriginIgnoreVerificationMode ignores verification entirely.
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TopOriginIgnoreVerificationMode
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// TopOriginAutoVerificationMode represents the automatic verification mode for the Top Origin. In this mode the
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// If the Top Origins parameter has values it checks against this, otherwise it checks against the Origins parameter.
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TopOriginAutoVerificationMode
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// TopOriginImplicitVerificationMode represents the implicit verification mode for the Top Origin. In this mode the
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// Top Origin is verified against the allowed Origins values.
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TopOriginImplicitVerificationMode
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// TopOriginExplicitVerificationMode represents the explicit verification mode for the Top Origin. In this mode the
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// Top Origin is verified against the allowed Top Origins values.
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TopOriginExplicitVerificationMode
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)
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